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PARTNERSHIPS AND THE "USED SECTION 38 PROPERTY"
INVESTMENT CREDIT: A WIDENING LOOPHOLE
DAVID BRIAN MURSTEN
President Carter, in his January 20, 1978, Tax Message to Con-
gress, stated that "[tihe investment tax credit has proven to be one
of the most potent tax incentives for capital formation."' To spur
investment, the President proposed a liberalization of the invest-
ment tax credit, designed to "make the investment credit a
stronger, more efficient, and more equitable incentive."' This note
will examine the availability of the investment tax credit in transac-
tions between a partnership and a partner.3
I. THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954-INVESTMENT CREDIT
PROVISIONS
Section 38 of the Internal Revenue Code of 19541 allows the invest-
ment tax credit as provided by Code sections 46-50 and authorizes
the Internal Revenue Service to promulgate legislative treasury reg-
ulations pursuant to section 38.1 "Section 38 property," under sec-
1. Carter, Tax Reform Proposals, 36 CONG. Q. 222, 231 (1978).
2. Id. The President's investment credit proposal has been summarized as follows:
The present 10 per cent investment tax credit, which was scheduled to drop to 7
per cent in 1981, would be continued permanently at 10 per cent. In addition, it
would be liberalized so that it could be used to offset up to 90 per cent of a
corporation's tax liability, as compared to the present 50 per cent ceiling. It also
would be extended to investments in industrial and utility structures, in addition
to applying to machinery and equipment. Carter also proposed allowing pollution
control equipment to qualify for the full 10 per cent credit, even if it qualifies
currently for five year amortization.
Carter estimated that the changes would encourage new business investment by
reducing taxes by $24.5 billion in 1979.
Conte, Carter Proposes $24.5 Billion Tax Cut, Limited 'Reforms, 36 CONG. Q. 164 (1978).
3. For detailed examinations of the investment credit in general, see 5 J. MERTENS, LAw
OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 32A.01-.70 (1975); 3 J. RABKIN & M. JOHNSON, FEDERAL
INCOME, GIwr AND ESTATE TAXATION §§ 45.11-.11B (1978); Bagley, How to Maximize Invest-
ment Tax Credits; Planning Under the Cases and Rulings, 43 J. TAX. 154 (1975); Jones, Are
Your Clients Getting the Most Out of the Investment Credit Provisions?, 12 TAX.
ACCOUNTANTS 196 (1974). For a discussion of the investment tax credit and partnerships, see
2 A. WILLIS, PARTNERSHIP TAXATION § § 69.01-.07 (2d ed. 1976).
4. INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954, as amended [hereinafter cited as I.R.C.].
5. I.R.C. § 38 provides:
SEC. 38. INVESTMENT IN CERTAIN DEPRECIABLE PROPERTY.
(a) GENERAL RULE.-There shall be allowed, as a credit against the tax
imposed by this chapter, the amount determined under subpart B of this
part.
(b) REGULATIONS.-The Secretary or his delegate shall prescribe such reg-
ulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this section and
subpart B.
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tion 48(a), means "most tangible personal property and certain real
property other than buildings or structural components." The
property must have a useful life of at least three years and qualify
under the Code for depreciation or amortization.7 Examples of sec-
tion 38 property listed under the section 48 regulations include:
production machinery, printing presses, transportation and office
equipment, refrigerators, grocery counters, testing equipment
. . .[and] any other tangible property . . . used as an integral
part of manufacturing, production, or extraction, or as an integral
part of furnishing transportation, communications, electrical en-
ergy, gas, water, or sewage disposal services by a person engaged
in a trade or business of furnishing any such service, or . . .a
research or storage facility used in connection with any of the
foregoing activities .... I
Other examples of section 38 property are law books,' income-
producing citrus trees,'0 certain citrus-processing equipment," cer-
tain farm improvements, 2 computers, 3 yachts, 4 and floating
docks. 5 Section 38 property does not include most intangible per-
sonal property or realty." For example, baseball and football player
6. Joseph L. Holloman, 1975 T.C.M. (P-H) 75,309, at 75-1325.
7. I.R.C. § 48(a)(1); see Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1 (1972).
8. Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(c)-(d) (1972).
9. Steven M. Kipperman, 1977 T.C.M. (P-H) 77,032.
10. Rev. Rul. 65-104, 1965-1 C.B. 28, clarified by Rev. Rul. 66-183, 1966-2 C.B. 47.
11. Central Citrus Co., 58 T.C. 365 (1972) ("sweet rooms"-used to ripen fruit, blowers,
coolers, and related processing equipment-qualify).
12. Rev. Rul. 66-89, 1966-1 C.B. 7 (fences used in connection with raising livestock, drain
tiles used to irrigate cultivated fields or improve pasture drainage, paved barnyards, water
wells used in connection with raising poultry or livestock, and facilities used and designed
solely for the storage of farm products qualify), clarified by Rev. Rul. 72-222, 1972-1 C.B. 17
(water wells).
13. Rev. Rul. 71-177, 1971-1 C.B. 5.
14. J. Wade Harris, 1975 T.C.M. (P-H) 75,276. Nondepreciable yachts do not qualify for
the credit. See Nicholls, North, Buse Co., 56 T.C. 1225 (1971), in which, upon failing to meet
the business use substantiation requirements of I.R.C. § 274 relating to the disallowance of
certain entertainment expenses, taxpayer's yacht was held nondepreciable and failed to qual-
ify for the credit.
15. Rev. Rul. 75-178, 1975-1 C.B. 9, revoking Rev. Rul. 67-67, 1967-1 C.B. 6 and Rev. Rul.
69-14, 1969-1 C.B. 26 (relating to movable partitions). The pilings to which the floating docks
are attached fail to qualify for the credit. Rev. Rul. 75-178 states that the determination of
whether property is "personal" or "inherently permanent" will be based upon the manner in
which the property is attached to the land or structure and "how permanently the property
is designed to remain in place." Id.
16. See Tress. Reg. § 1.48-1 (1972).
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contracts," mobile homes rented mostly to nontransients,"s and
sports stadiums" fail to qualify.
"[Blecause of the greater dependence of small business on used
property, a limited credit [was] also made available for used prop-
erty which is newly acquired." 2' Property qualifies as used section
38 property unless the person who uses the property after its acquisi-
tion is the same person or is related to the person who used the
property prior to the acquisition.2' For example, property acquired
by a component member of a controlled group from another member
of the same controlled group does not qualify as used section 38
property .22
Also excluded from the definition of used section 38 property is
property acquired in transactions between family members; be-
tween shareholders and corporations; between personal holding
17. Rev. Rul. 71-137, 1971-1 C.B. 104 (football player contracts); Rev. Rul. 67-379, 1967-
2 C.B. 127 (baseball player contracts). Player contracts fail to qualify because they are
intangible property.
18. Moore v. Commissioner, 489 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1973), aff'g 58 T.C. 1045 (1972). Under
I.R.C. § 48(a), real property may qualify if it is rented mostly to transients. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.48-1(h) (1972).
19. Rev. Rul. 69-170, 1969-1 C.B. 28. As real property, the stadium fails to qualify. But,
the stadium's nonstructural comnponents-the seats, field lights, flagpoles, batter's eyescreen,
and foul line poles are qualifying " 'other tangible property' as defined in section 1.48-1(d) of
the regulations." Id. at 29.
20. H.R. REP. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, 9 (1962), reprinted in 1962-3 C.B. 405,
413.
21. I.R.C. § 48(c) provides:
(C) USED SECTION 38 PROPERTY.-
(1) IN GENERAL.-For purposes of this subpart, the term "used section 38 prop-
erty" means section 38 property acquired by purchase after December 31, 1961,
which is not new section 38 property. Property shall not be treated as "used section
38 property" if, after its acquisition by the taxpayer, it is used by a person who used
such property before such acquisition (or by a person who bears a relationship
described in section 179(d)(2)(A) or (B) to a person who used such property before
such acquisition).
I.R.C. § 179(d)(2) provides:
(2) PURCHASE DEFINED.- . . . [Tihe term "purchase" means any acquisition
of property, but only if-
(A) the property is not acquired from a person whose relationship to the person
acquiring it would result in the disallowance of losses under section 267 or 707(b)
(but, in applying section 267(b) and (c) for purposes of this section, paragraph (4)
of section 267(c) shall be treated as providing that the family of an individual shall
include only his spouse, ancestors, and lineal descendants),
(B) the property is not acquired by one component member of a controlled
group from another component member of the same controlled group . ...
22. Treas. Reg. § 1.48-3(d)(4) (1972) defines "component member of a controlled group"
(referring to related corporations) in terms of I.R.C. § 1563(a) and (b), except that the phrase
"more than 50 percent" is substituted for the phrase "at least 80 percent" each time it
appears in I.R.C. § 1563(a)(1). (I.R.C. § 1563 provides definitions and special rules for con-
trolled corporations filing under Code chapter 6 relating to consolidated returns.)
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companies, trust fiduciaries, beneficiaries, and corporations related
to the trust; and between certain charitable organizations."
Property also fails to qualify if acquired in transactions between
a partnership and a partner who owns more than fifty percent of the
capital interest or the profits interest in the partnership or in trans-
actions between "two partnerships in which the same persons own,
directly or indirectly, more than 50 percent of the capital interests
or profits interests. '24 Thus, a partnership will be treated as an
entity, separate from a partner, if the partner is not, directly or
indirectly, a more-than-fifty-percent partner. Similarly, separate
partnerships will be treated as separate entities if they do not share
partners who directly or indirectly own more than fifty percent of
both partnerships.
But, under the section 1.48-3(a)(2)(ii) regulation, the Service
sidetracks entity treatment and attributes to a partner the use of
property by his partnership irrespective of the extent of his partner-
ship interest. This regulation states that "property used by a part-
nership shall be considered as used by each partner" and treats a
partnership as a collection of individuals or an aggregate-rather
than as an entity identifiable separately from the partners." Yet, as
will be discussed in the remainder of this note, this regulation ap-
pears to be invalid.
II. CASES AND RULINGS
A. Edward A. Moradian
In 1944, Edward Moradian and one Hagopian bought land as
tenants in common .2 Shortly thereafter they entered into a farming
partnership which grew and sold grapes. The partners divided prof-
its and losses equally. The partnership never owned the farm land,
and apparently the partners allowed their partnership to use the
land without a formal agreement.Y In May, 1964, the partnership
23. See I.R.C. § 267(b)-(c).
24. Id. § 707(b). A partner will be treated as owning, indirectly, the partnership interest
of certain related individuals. See id. §§ 267(c), 707(b)(3).
25. Treas. Reg. § 1.48-3(a)(2)(ii) (1972).
26. Edward A. Moradian, 53 T.C. 207 (1969), appeal dismissed, [1978] 2 FED. TAxEs (P-
H) 5982(35) (9th Cir. 1970), nonacq. 1973-1 C.B. 2; 1973-2 C.B. 4.
27. 53 T.C. at 214 (Scott, J., dissenting).
Because land is owned by partners and used by their partnership, it does not automatically
become partnership property owned by the partners as tenants in partnership:
Real estate owned by a partner, or by the partners as cotenants, before formation
of the firm may be occupied and used by the firm without any agreement that it
shall become partnership property. It remains separate property, hence subject to
the prior rights of separate creditors of the owning partner in the event of a distribu-
"USED SECTION 38 PROPERTY"
dissolved. Immediately thereafter, Hagopian conveyed his undi-
vided one-half interest in the land and grapevines to Moradian's
wife, Georgia.2" For her purchase of the grapevines, Georgia took a
used section 38 property investment credit.
The Service disallowed the credit, relying on its use attribution
regulation, which provides that "property used by a partnership
shall be considered as used by each partner." The Service asserted
that Georgia's purchase would have qualified but for Edward's use
of the grapevines before and after the acquisition.
The Tax Court held that the two partnerships were neither the
same person nor related persons. The court examined the definition
of the term "person" and found that "person" means partnership,
"unless otherwise distinctly expressed or manifestly incompatible
with the intent of a particular section." 30 Because two different part-
nerships used the grapevines, the same person did not use the
grapevines before and after the acquisition. Thus, the acquisition
qualified as a purchase. In applying the related person test, the
court employed the adopted-by-reference Code section relating to
partnerships, section 707(b) .3' Again, it found that the acquisition
qualified as a purchase since no partner owned more than fifty
percent of the capita.1 interest or the profits interest in the two
partnerships.32
Contemplating the validity of the Service's use attribution regu-
lation, the court examined the legislative history of the investment
credit.3 It determined from the expressed purpose of the credit-to
tion of insolvent estates. Thus, mere use or occupancy by the partnership does little
or nothing to show that land or other fixed assets have become partnership prop-
erty, whether at the start of the firm or later on.
J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, CRANE & BROMBERG ON PARTNERSMP § 37(b), at 204-05 (1968)
(footnotes omitted). But, property "subsequently acquired by purchase or otherwise, on ac-
count of the partnership, is partnership property . . . unless the contrary intention appears
." UNFORm PARTNERsHiP AcT § 8(l)-(2); see J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, supra at 202-13.
28. It is unclear how Hagopian came to own the grapevines, which, as property acquired
subsequent to formation of the partnership, were most likely Moradian-Hagopian partnership
property. See note 27 supra and text accompanying note 43 infra.
29. Treas. Reg. § 1.48-3(a)(2)(ii) (1972).
30. 53 T.C. at 211; see I.R.C. § 7701(a)(1).
31. See I.R.C. § 48(c)(1), which incorporates I.R.C. § 179(d)(2)(A) (quoted at note 21
supra), which incorporates I.R.C. § 707(b).
32. Regarding the more-than-50% test, see J.T. McKay, 1968 T.C.M. (P-H) 68,275, a
case in which a partner (owning 100% of the capital interest in a partnership), upon acquiring
used § 38 property from the partnership, unsuccessfully sought the investment credit.
33. Upon the recommendation of President Kennedy, the investment credit was enacted
in 1962. Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 2, 76 Stat. 960 (current version at I.R.C.
§ § 38, 46-48). It was designed to "stimulate the domestic economy and make it more effective
in competition with foreign products by modernizing and expanding both plant and equip-
ment. ... 5 J. MERTENS, supra note 3, at § 32A.01; see H.R. REP. No. 1447, supra note
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20, at 7, reprinted in 1962-3 C.B. 405, 411; S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2, 10-12
(1962), reprinted in [1962] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3297, 3304-05, 3313-14 and in 1962-
3 C.B. 707, 707-08, 716-18. By encouraging capital expenditures, the credit spurred employ-
ment-the need for additional workers to construct and operate the credit encouraged capital
investments. The credit was touted to "both aid in providing the longrun [sic] growth
needed by our domestic economy and be of major assistance in our more immediate problem
of economic recovery." S. REP. No. 1881, supra at 2, reprinted in 11962) U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 3297, 3304 and in 1962-3 C.B. 707, 708. Although the credit as originally proposed
was expected to cost about $900 million, H.R. REP. No. 1447, supra at 6, reprinted in 1962-3
C.B. 405, 410, it was pointed out that "the stimulus it provides to new investments will have
favorable effects on the level of economic activity . . . and that this will in turn add to federal
revenues." Id. at 7, reprinted in 1962-3 C.B. 405, 411.
The credit was suspended from October 10, 1966, until March 9, 1967, in order to "moderate
the pace of the economy to a more sustainable level of economic growth." S. REP. No. 1724,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1966), reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4327, 4328
and in 1966-2 C.B. 925; see I.R.C. § 48(j): "[Tlhe term 'suspension period' means the period
beginning October 10, 1966, and ending March 9, 1967." See also Zeitlin, Suspension of
Investment Credit and Accelerated Depreciation-Application to Related Taxpayers, in 25
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY TWENTY-FIrIt ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 1331-32 (H.
Sellin ed. 1967).
Effective April 18, 1969, the credit was again terminated with the enactment of the Tax
Reform Act of 1969. Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 703, 83 Stat. 487. Section 703 of the Tax Reform
Act of 1969 enacted I.R.C. § 49, then titled "Termination of Credit." Congress terminated
the credit upon finding that "present defects in the tax structure impede the proper function-
ing of the economic system." S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1969), reprinted in
[1969] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2027, 2041 and in 1969-3 C.B. 423, 431.
Because of the double economic effect of suspension of the investment credit
[misplaced reliance upon the future availability of the credit, and the distortion
of the timing of investments] and because of the administrative problems involved
in turning the credit off and on, your committee [the House Committee on Ways
and Means] has concluded that it is better to repeal the investment credit than to
suspend it.
H.R. REp. No. 413 (pt. 1), 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 180 (1969), reprinted in [1969] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1645, 1833 and in 1969-3 C.B. 200, 312. These defects were found to
"encourage legal and technical efforts to minimize taxes land] encourage transactions for
tax purposes rather than for economic reasons." S. REP. No. 552, supra at 14, reprinted in
[1969] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2027, 2041 and in 1969-3 C.B. 423, 431. The House
Committee on Ways and Means' report stated that the defects
result in a misallocation of resources and may misdirect investment into those areas
[in which] special tax benefits are provided. . . .This is true, for example, in the
case of the investment credit which was adopted in 1962 as a method of attracting
investment in plant and equipment but which in the last 2 years appears to have
been an important factor in overheating the capital goods industry.
Id. The repeal of the credit saved the treasury approximately $2.5 billion in 1970. See id. at
6, reprinted in [1969] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2027, 2032 and in 1969-3 C.B. 423, 432-
33.
Congress restored the investment credit upon enacting the Revenue Act of 1971. Pub. L.
No. 92-178, § 101, 85 Stat. 497. Section 101 of the Revenue Act of 1971 enacted I.R.C. § 50,
"Restoration of Credit," and amended and retitled I.R.C. § 49 "Termination for Period
Beginning April 19, 1969, and Ending During 1971." The committee reports accompanying
the act pointed out that among other things, it was designed to again put the "lagging
economy on the high growth path. . . ,increase the number of jobs and diminish the high
unemployment rate . . . [and] provide a rational system of tax incentives to aid in the
modernization of our productive facilities." H.R. REp. No. 533, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1971),
reprinted in [1971] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1825 and in 1972-1 C.B. 498; S. REP. No.
437, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1971), reprinted in [1971] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1918
and in 1972-1 C.B. 559. The reports made particular note that capital goods expenditures had
"USED SECTION 38 PROPERTY"
stimulate the growth and expansion of the American economy by
encouraging capital investment-that Congress intended a liberal
reading of the statute.
Regarding the abuses Congress sought to prevent in enacting the
statutory "use" tests, the court was unable to find any reference to
partnerships in the committee reports. But it inferred from the re-
ports that "the abuse envisioned by Congress was the possibility
that an investment credit [would] be procured by an individual
under circumstances in which the purposes of the investment credit
are not served."3' More directly stated, the envisioned abuse was
that property would be acquired but the user of the property would
remain the same or would be closely related to the pre-acquisition
user. Thus, new investment would not be stimulated.
Having determined that the two partnerships were neither the
same person nor related, the court found that the envisioned abuse
had not occurred. Therefore, it refused to apply the Service's attri-
bution regulation and held it invalid as applied. The court stated
that to apply the regulation would be contrary to the legislative
intent expressed in the statute and the committee reports.3 5
Six judges dissented in two opinions. In one dissent, Judge Tan-
nenwald asserted that even if partnerships are treated as entities
under the Code's partnership provisions, the entity theory of part-
nerships "clearly need not be applied beyond those provisions. '3
This is apparent from the conference committee report accompany-
ing the 1954 Code:
Both the House provisions and the Senate Amendment provide for
the use of the "entity" approach in the treatment of the transac-
tions between a partner and a partnership which are described
above [sections 701-708]. No inference is intended, however, that
a partnership is to be treated as a separate entity for the purpose
of applying other provisions of the internal revenue laws if the
concept of the partnership as a collection of individuals is more
appropriate for such provisions."
"hardly grown at all." H.R. REP. No. 533, supra at 3, reprinted in [1971] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 1825, 1827 and in 1972-1 C.B. 498, 499; S. REP. No. 437, supra at 6, reprinted in
[19711 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD NEWS 1918, 1922 and in 1972-1 C.B. 559, 562.
34. 53 T.C. at 213.
35. "In our view, under the particular facts of this case the [Service's] position and
regulations cited to the extent they support [its] position are contrary to the intent of
Congress as expressed in the statute and in the committee reports and are to that extent
invalid." Id. at 210-11.
36. Id. at 215.
37. Id. (quoting H.R. REp. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (1954)).
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Judge Tannenwald stated that because section 38(b) conferred upon
the Service the power to promulgate legislative regulations, that is,
"specific statutory authority to 'prescribe such regulations as may
be necessary to carry out the purposes of' those provisions," the
regulations "should not be declared invalid unless clearly contrary
to'the legislative mandate."' In view of the conference committee
report, the dissent would have held the regulation valid since it is
not clearly contrary to the legislative mandate. Thus, the dissent
would have applied the Service's attribution regulation and treated
a partnership as an aggregate for purposes of the used section 38
property investment credit.
"To what extent courts or legislators have treated or should treat
partnerships as entities has been a matter of considerable dis-
pute. 13 9 The Uniform Partnership Act, adopted by forty-eight
states,40 treats a partnership as an entity for some purposes and as
an aggregate for others. 4' These opposing theories are likewise em-
bodied in the Internal Revenue Code:
38. Id. at 216 (citing Commissioner v. South Tex. Co., 333 U.S. 496 (1948); Lucas v.
American Code Co., 280 U.S. 445 (1930)).
The Service promulgates two types of regulations: interpretative and legislative. Interpre-
tative regulations are promulgated under I.R.C. § 7805, which authorizes "all needful rules
and regulations for the enforcement of" the Code. These regulations state the position of the
Service and are given great weight by the courts. Legislative regulations are promulgated
under particular Code sections, like I.R.C. § 38(b), in which Congress delegated to the Secre-
tary of the Treasury specific authority to write detailed rules. A legislative regulation is
accorded greater weight than an interpretative regulation and is "given the force and effect
of law unless the Regulation exceeds the scope of the delegated power [M.E. Blatt Co. v.
United States, 305 U.S. 267 (1938)1, is contrary to the statute [Joseph Weidenhoff, Inc., 32
T.C. 1222, acq. 1960-2 C.B. 7], or is unreasonable [Miller v. Commissioner, 333 F.2d 400
(8th Cir. 1964); McCord v. Granger, 201 F.2d 103 (3d Cir. 1952)]. Having the effect of law,
these Regulations bind both the Commissioner and the taxpayer." Rogovin, The Four R's:
Regulations, Rulings, Reliance and Retroactivity, 43 TAxEs 756, 759 (1965) (footnotes indi-
cated in brackets).
39. J. CRANE & A. BROMBERO, supra note 27, at 18 (citing Crane, The Uniform Partnership
Act-A Criticism, 28 HARv. L. REv. 762 (1915); Crane, The Uniform Partnership Act and
Legal Persons, 29 HAsv. L. Rev. 838 (1916); Drake, Partnership Entity and Tenancy in
Partnership, 15 MICH. L. REv. 609 (1917); Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act-A Reply to
Mr. Crane's Criticism, 29 HAuv. L. REv. 158, 291 (1916); Wright, Opposition of the Law to
Business Usages, 26 COLUM. L. Rav. 917, 927 (1926); and other authorities); see J. CRANE,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIPS AND OTHER UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS 9-21 (2d
ed. 1952); J. CRANE & A. BROMBERO, supra note 27, at 16-18.
40. The Act has also been adopted by the District of Columbia, Guam, and the Virgin
Islands. Georgia and Louisiana have not adopted the Uniform Partnership Act. 6 UNIFORM
LAws ANN. 7 (Supp. 1978).
41. For example, a partnership is treated as an entity by Uniform Partnership Act §§ 2,
8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, 21, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 35(1)(b), and 40(a)II(h) and (i). Jensen,
Is a Partnership Under the Uniform Partnership Act an Aggregate or an Entity?, 16 VAND.
L. REv. 377, 379 n.11 (1963). A partnership is viewed as an aggregate of individuals by
Uniform Partnership Act §§ 15, 29, 31, and 34. A. ARONSOHN, PARTNERSHP INCOME TAxEs 2
n.9 (6th ed. 1974).
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Although the partnership is not a separate taxpaying entity, it is
a separate entity for the purpose of computing, reporting, and
allocating the consequences of partnership activities. The partner-
ship has its own taxable year and it, rather than the individual
partners, makes the basic decisions with respect to the computa-
tion of partnership income. It determines for example, the method
of computing depreciation of partnership property, whether to use
a cash or accrual method of accounting, and whether to elect to
report income under the installment method."
Furthermore, according to the Moradian majority, a partnership is
an entity for purposes of the used section 38 property investment
credit.
The other Moradian dissenting opinion, by Judge Scott, reflected
the confusion about property and partnerships. Scott stated that
"certainly the persons who owned the land owned the vines attached
thereto absent any agreement to the contrary." The presumption
in this assertion is reversed. Property acquired subsequent to the
formation of a partnership is partnership property unless a contrary
intention appears." And, although tangible personalty may be
owned by a partner and seemingly loaned to the partnership, the
conduct of the partners may indicate an intention that the property
"shall pass to the firm. A strong presumption to this effect should
arise when the property is of a kind sold in the ordinary course of
business (inventory) or consumed in its operation (supplies)."' 5
Under these circumstances the partners would own the property as
tenants in partnership."6
42. Weidner, Pratt and Deductions for Payments to Partners, 12 REAL PROP., PNoB. & TR.
J. 811 (1977) (citations omitted) (includes a thorough examination of the availability of a tax
deduction for payments made by a partnership to a partner and a review of the tension
between the entity and aggregate theories embodied within the Code); see I.R.C. §§ 167,
446(c), 453, 701, 703, 706; Treas. Reg. § 1.703-1(b) (1974); A. ARoNsoHN, supra note 41, at 1-
3; 1 A. WILLis, supra note 3, at §§ 2.01-.04.
This schizophrenia is also embodied in Treas. Reg. § 1.267(b)-l(b) (1960). This regulation
affirms that transactions between a member of a partnership and the partnership "are gov-
erned by section 707 for the purposes of which the partnership is considered to be an entity
separate from the partners." But, regarding transactions between the partnership and a
nonpartner, the regulation treats the partnership as an aggregate, that is, a collection of
individuals: "Any transaction ... between a partnership and a person other than a partner
shall be considered as occurring between the other person and the members of the partnership
separately."
43. 53 T.C. at 214.
44. See note 27 supra.
45. J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, supra note 27, at 206 (footnote omitted).
46. See UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT § 25(1). This doctrine is important, for example, in
protecting a partner's interest in partnership property from the separate creditors of another
partner. Absent tenancy in partnership, separate creditors could jeopardize the partnership
as a going concern by attaching partnership property. Under the Uniform Partnership Act, a
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The Ninth Circuit dismissed the Service's appeal of Moradian,
but the Service nonacquiesced in the decision, 7 indicating its inten-
tion to relitigate the issue should it arise again."8 Indeed, subsequent
to its nonacquiescence, the Service stated in Revenue Ruling 74-64
that it would "continue to apply section 1.48-3(a)(2)(ii) of the regu-
lations and treat partnership property as being used by each partner
notwithstanding the decision of the United States Tax Court in
Edward A. Moradian ... ,
B. Subsequent Rulings and Litigation
Revenue Ruling 74-64 applied the section 1.48-3(a)(2)(ii) regula-
tion. A and B entered into a joint venture as equal partners. They
purchased an oil lease and drilling equipment and took a "new
section 38 property" investment credit. After wells had been drilled,
A sold one-half of his fifty percent interest to C. The drilling equip-
ment used by joint venture AB continued in use by joint venture
ABC. Although the AB joint venture had not elected to be treated
as a partnership for subchapter K purposes, under Revenue Ruling
65-118 it was a partnership for section 38 purposes. 50
C unsuccessfully sought an investment credit for the acquisition
of used section 38 property. Applying the section 1.48-3(a)(2)(ii)
regulation, the Service attributed "partnership" AB's use to A and
B and attributed "partnership" ABC's use to A, B, and C. Because
A and B used the property before and after the acquisition, the
Service determined that C's purchase failed to qualify for the in-
vestment credit." Moreover, due to his disposition of the property
prior to the expiration of its useful life, A's investment credit was
recaptured under section 47(a)."
Joseph L. Holloman returned this issue of partnership use attri-
creditor instead may subject a debtor-partner's interest to a charging order. See id. §§
25(c)(2), 28.
47. 1973-1 C.B. 2; 1973-2 C.B. 4.
48. For an examination of the Service's nonacquiescence policy, see Martin, The Commis-
sioner's Nonacquiescence, 40 S. CAL. L. REv. 550 (1967); Uretz, The Chief Counsel's Policy
Regarding Acquiescence and Nonacquiescence in Tax Court Cases, 44 IND. L.J. 206 (1969);
Comment, Treasury Department's Practice of Nonacquiescence to Court Decisions, 28 ALB.
L. REv. 274 (1964).
49. Rev. Rul. 74-64, 1974-1 C.B. 12, 13 (citation omitted).
50. Rev. Rul. 65-118, 1965-1 C.B. 30.
51. Example five of Treas. Reg. § 1.48-3(a) (1972) provides: "[Iff F buys C's [one-third)
interest in partnership CDE, such acquisition would not result in the acquisition of used
section 38 property by F. . .because the partnership property is used by the same persons
(partners D and E) who used the property before the acquisition."
52. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.47-1 to 3 (1972); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.47-4 to 6 (1967); 2 A. WILLIS,
supra note 3, at §§ 69.06-.07.
"USED SECTION 38 PROPERTY"
bution to the Tax Court.53 Holloman, a dentist, became an employee
of a sole practitioner dentist in October, 1970. On January 1, 1971,
he purchased one-half of his employer's accounts receivable, and the
two became fifty percent partners. Holloman's partner retained
ownership of all dental equipment and leased it to the partnership.
On August 31, 1971, the partnership terminated. Holloman bought
his partner's fifty percent interest. He also bought the dental equip-
ment. For the acquisition of the dental equipment, Holloman took
a "used section 38 property" investment credit.
The Service disallowed the credit, asserting that the same person,
Holloman, had used the property both before and after the acquisi-
tion. Again the Service relied on the section 1.48-3(a)(2)(ii) regula-
tion providing that "property used by a partnership shall be consid-
ered as used by each partner" and asserted that the partnership
should be treated as an aggregate of individuals rather than as an
entity.
The Tax Court allowed that "Congress . . . felt that no credit
should be allowed where no change in ownership took place" 5' but
found that "the abuse which Congress sought to prevent [had] not
occurred."" Relying on Moradian, the court held that the partner-
ship was the "person" using the property after the acquisition. The
court suggested that congressional intent had "at least indirectly"
been fulfilled. Although Holloman had purchased the assets of a
preexisting business, if his former partner wanted to "continue in
business as a dentist, he [would] have to go out and purchase new
or used dental equipment to replace the equipment he sold to
[Holloman] ."5
The Service unsuccessfully appealed. The Fifth Circuit held that
the section 48(c)(1) reference to "used by a person" "does not mean
the individual person who actually physically used the equipment,
but refers to the legal entity which was using the equipment."57
Thus, the court held the attribution regulation invalid except to the
extent that it applies to a partner owning more than fifty percent
of the capital or the profits interest in a partnership. That is, a
partnership is recognized as a separate entity unless a partner is a
"more-than-fifty-percent" partner.
Reductio ad absurdum, the court suggested that if the use test
was based upon physical use, the credit would be disallowed "if a
53. 1975 T.C.M. (P-H) 75,309, aff'd, 551 F.2d 987 (5th Cir. 1977).
54. Id. at 75-1325.
55. Id. at 75-1327.
56. Id.
57. 551 F.2d 987, 989 (5th Cir. 1977).
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taxpayer started a new business and purchased equipment from
another wholly unrelated taxpayer and then hired to operate the
equipment the same person who had operated it for the former
owner."" Unfortunately for the government, the court appeared to
be unwilling to distinguish between productive use for trade or busi-
ness and mere operation.
Prior to the Fifth Circuit's Holloman opinion, the Tax Court re-
jected another attempt by the Service to apply the section 1.48-
3(a)(2)(ii) regulation in Steven M. Kipperman.9 Kipperman and
one Silber shared a law office from January, 1971, to June, 1973. The
two lawyers practiced independently. But they were tenants in com-
mon, and each owned an undivided one-half interest in the office's
furnishings and books. In June, 1973, Kipperman formed a law part-
nership with two otherwise unrelated individuals, with each partner
owning a one-third interest. The partnership bought Kipperman's
undivided one-half interest in the furnishings and books and,
shortly thereafter, bought Silber's undivided one-half interest in the
furnishings. The parties then exchanged their undivided interests in
certain books in return for the undivided interest of the other party
in the remainder of the books.
On his 1973 tax return, Kipperman reported the recapture of the
investment credit originally taken on the purchase of the assets he
sold to his partnership. Kipperman also took his share of the part-
nership's investment credit for its acquisition of the furnishings and
the books: used section 38 property. The Service disallowed the
credit, asserting that the acquisition failed to qualify because the
same person, Kipperman, used the property before and after the
acquisition. Again it attributed the partnership's use to Kipperman,
although he owned only a one-third interest in the partnership.
The Service tried "desperately to distinguish the facts of this case
from Moradian and Holloman. "60 It asserted that Kipperman "had
both the use and the ownership of the concerned property before and
after the pertinent acquisition whereas . . . [Georgia] Moradian
had neither the use nor ownership of the property before the acquisi-
tion, and [Holloman] had the use but not the ownership prior to
the acquisition."'" Unpersuaded, the Tax Court followed Moradian
and Holloman, finding that the property "was owned and used by
the partnership, a different entity than the person, petitioner indi-
58. Id.
59. 1977 T.C.M. (P-H) 1 77,032.
60. Id. at 77-147.
61. Id.
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vidually [Kipperman] who in part owned and used the property
before the acquisition by the partnership." 2
III. CONCLUSION
Moradian, Holloman, and Kipperman indicate that so long as no
partner owns more than fifty percent of a partnership, the used
section 38 property investment credit will be available. It is surpris-
ing that the Tax Court has adopted this liberal position, and its
opinions in these cases seem weak.
For example, contrary to the Tax Court's assertion that Hollo-
man's former partner would have to purchase new equipment in
order to remain in the dental business, Holloman could hire his
former partner as an employee. 3 No new investment would be
spurred. Kipperman suggests another possible abuse: upon becom-
ing attorneys, two or more recent graduates could form an equal law
partnership. Each could sell his old casebooks and hornbooks to the
firm and obtain a used section 38 property investment
credit-without "spurring new investment." 4 Additionally, the
books would generate depreciation deductions.
The Moradian dissent discredits the majority's opinion, but,
amazingly, the two Holloman opinions and Kipperman blandly fol-
low Moradian. The 1954 legolative history espousing the aggregate
theory over entity treatment should have been sufficient to uphold
the voided regulation. But the Kipperman court again expressly
rejected the Service's assertion, although it indicated that the issue
might be revisited. 5
The Service might acquiesce on this matter because the invest-
ment tax credit expires soon-on January 1, 1981. Or the Service
might encourage Congress to address the issue, which could prove
to be particularly important in view of the government's recent
interest in providing more tax incentives to aid business. A contin-
62. Id. Kipperman prevailed when the Tax Court granted his motion for summary judg-
ment.
63. The infirmity of this example is that Holloman's partner personally owned and used
the property prior to formation of the partnership. Holloman's acquisition probably would
not qualify as a purchase because the same person-Holloman's partner-would be using the
property before and after the acquisition, although another person, the partnership, inter-
posed the uses. But, given a situation in which the use of the property originated with a
partnership, one partner could purchase the property from the partnership, obtain the invest-
ment credit, and hire his former partner.
64. The tax credit would inure to the partnership, but because a partnership is considered
an aggregate for the purposes of allocating the economic consequences of partnership activi-
ties, and because under I.R.C. § 702(a)(7) tax credits are among the items constituting a
partner's distributive share, the partners would obtain the credit.
65. 1977 T.C.M. (P-H) 77,032, at 77-147.
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ued and increased investment credit for used section 38 property
might be enacted to allow small business to share in the incentives.
Then the importance of tightening the rules for obtaining this credit
would be heightened.
